Ottawa, January 13, 2026 — The Competition Tribunal has dismissed an application by independent video game developer Alexander Martin seeking leave to bring a competition law case against Alphabet Inc., Google LLC, Google Canada Corporation, Apple Inc., and Apple Canada Inc. under sections 79 and 90.1 of the Competition Act.
In reasons issued by Justice Andrew D. Little, Chairperson of the Tribunal, the Tribunal refused to grant leave under section 103.1 of the Act, concluding that it was not satisfied that granting leave would be in the public interest, as required under the recently amended provision.
The application was the first in which the Tribunal was required to interpret and apply the new “public interest” branch of subsection 103.1(7), which came into force in June 2025. That amendment allows leave to be granted not only where an applicant is directly and substantially affected in their business, but also where the Tribunal is satisfied that granting leave is in the public interest.
Mr. Martin sought leave to allege that Google abuses a dominant position in the Canadian general search engine market, contrary to section 79 of the Act, and that Google and Apple have entered into an anti-competitive agreement contrary to section 90.1. At a high level, he alleged that Google holds more than 90 per cent of the general search engine market and has maintained that position through revenue-sharing agreements, including the Information Services Agreement with Apple, under which Google is set as the default search engine on Apple devices in exchange for substantial payments.
The applicant also alleged that the agreement discouraged Apple from entering the general search engine market, foreclosed rivals from key distribution channels, created “choice friction” for users, and substantially lessened or prevented competition in Canada. He sought prohibition orders and potential monetary remedies under subsections 79(4.1) and 90.1(10.1).
Google and Apple opposed the application, arguing that it lacked evidentiary support, was not suitable for public interest standing, and risked opening the door to unmeritorious or strategic litigation. The Commissioner of Competition intervened on the legal test but took no position on the outcome.
In its reasons, the Tribunal held that the phrase “in the public interest” in subsection 103.1(7) should be interpreted consistently with the Supreme Court of Canada’s common law test for public interest standing, as set out in Downtown Eastside Sex Workers and Council of Canadians with Disabilities, but adapted to the competition law context. The Tribunal articulated a modified three-step framework: whether the proposed application raises a substantial and genuine competition law dispute; whether the applicant has a genuine interest in the matter; and whether the proposed proceeding is a reasonable and effective means of resolving the competition issues raised.
Applying that framework, the Tribunal found that while the proposed application raised genuine competition law issues and was conceptually plausible, it was weakly supported by evidence at the leave stage. The Tribunal also found that the applicant’s evidence did not adequately demonstrate a genuine public interest beyond his status as a user of general search engines, nor did it establish his capacity to advance a complex competition law case in a sufficiently concrete and well-developed factual setting.
Justice Little concluded that, weighing the three factors cumulatively, the Tribunal was not satisfied that granting leave would be in the public interest. The application for leave was therefore dismissed.
The Tribunal declined to award costs, despite extensive submissions by the parties, finding that the case was not appropriate for a costs order.
The decision is reported as Martin v Alphabet Inc., Google LLC, Google Canada Corporation, Apple Inc., and Apple Canada Inc., 2026 Comp Trib 3.
Source: https://decisions.ct-tc.gc.ca/ct-tc/cdo/en/item/521665/index.do
